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"No religious feeling, properly so called, has developed itself; nor is it yet time, perhaps, to look for it; but she has shown a disposition to respect those who have power and knowledge; and to love those who have goodness; and when her perceptive faculties shall have taken cognizance of the operations of nature, and she shall be accustomed to trace effects to their causes, then may her veneration be turned to Him who is almighty, her respect to Him who is omniscient, and her love to Him who is all goodness and love!

"Until then, I shall not deem it wise, by premature effort, to incur the risk of giving her ideas of God which would be alike unworthy of His character and fatal to her peace. I should fear that she might personify Him in a way too common with children, who clothe Him with unworthy, and sometimes grotesque attributes, which their subsequently developed reason condemns but strives in vain to correct.

"I have thus far confined myself to relating the various phenomena which this remarkable case presents. I have related the facts, and each one will make his own deductions. But as I am almost invariably questioned by intelligent visitors of the Institution about my opinion of her moral nature, and by what theory I can account for such and such phenomena; and as many pious people have questioned me respecting her religious nature, I will here state my views.

"There seem to have been in this child no innate ideas, or innate moral principles; that is in the sense in which Locke, Condillac, and others, use those terms. But there are innate intellectual dispositions; and moreover, innate moral dispositions, not derived, as many metaphysicians suppose, from the exercise of intellectual faculties, but as independent in their existence as the intellectual dispositions themselves.

"I shall be easily understood, when I speak of innate dispositions, in contradistinction to innate ideas, by those who are at all conversant with metaphysics; but as this case excites peculiar interest, even among children, I may be excused for explaining. We have no innate ideas of colour, of distance, etc. Were we blind, we never could conceive the idea of colour, nor understand how light and shade could give knowledge of distance. But we might have the innate disposition, or internal adaptation, which enables us to perceive colour, and to judge of distance; and were the organ of sight suddenly to be restored to healthy action, we should gradually understand the natural language, so to call it, of light; and soon be able to judge of distance by reason of our innate disposition or capacity.

"So much for an intellectual perception. As an example of a moral perception, it may be supposed, for instance, that we have no innate idea of God, but that we have an innate disposition, or adaptation, not only to recognize, but to adore Him: and when the idea of a God is presented, we embrace it, because we have that internal adaptation which enables us to do so.

"If the idea of a God were innate, it would be universal and identical, and not the consequential effect of the exercise of causality; it would be impossible to present Him under different aspects. He would not be regarded as Jupiter, Jehovah, Brahma; we could not make different people clothe Him with different attributes, any more than we can make them consider two and two to make three, or five, or anything but four.

"But, on the other hand, if we had no innate disposition, to receive the idea of a God, then could we never have conceived one, any more than we can conceive of time without a beginning -- then would the most incontrovertible evidence to man, of God's existence have been wanting, viz. the internal evidence of his own nature.

"Now it does appear to me very evident, from the phenomena manifested in Laura's case, that she has innate moral dispositions and tendencies, which, though developed subsequently (in the order of time) to her intellectual faculties, are not dependent upon them, nor are they manifested with a force proportionate to that of her intellect.

"According to Locke's theory, the moral qualities and faculties of this child should be limited in proportion to the limitation of her senses; for he derives moral principles from intellectual dispositions, which alone he considers to be innate. He thinks moral principles must be proved, and can be so only by an exercised intellect.

"Now the sensations of Laura are very limited; acute as is her touch, and constant as is her exercise of it, how vastly does she fall behind others of her age in the amount of sensations which she experiences! how limited is the range of her thought! how infantile is she in the exercise of her intellect! But her moral qualities -- her moral sense, are remarkably acute; few children are so affectionate, or so scrupulously conscientious; few are so sensible of their own rights, or regardful of the rights of others.

"Can anyone suppose, then, that without innate moral dispositions, such effects could have been produced solely by moral lessons? For even if such lessons could have been given to her, would they not have been seed sown upon barren ground? Her moral sense, and her conscientiousness, seem not at all dependent upon any intellectual perception. They are not perceived, indeed, nor understood -- they are felt; and she may feel them even more strongly than most adults.