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We know historically, and from the commentators in the Federalist, that there was, at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, much uncertainty about the boundary lines between the States, and of course about their respective titles to, or interest in, the unoccupied domain which was ceded by the several states to the United States, and also that all of the States interested in the said domain had not executed deeds of cession at the time the Constitution was framed by the convention; and we know, from the same evidence, that the clause relied upon by the President was designed merely to save any rights or titles which had not been and should not be ceded to the United States, and also at the same time to save unjust claims which the United States had, by or independent of such deeds of cession. Now, it is absurd to say that the bill before us prejudiced any claim of the United States; for it assumes that the property disposed of is exclusively the property of the United States. It is equally absurd to say that it prejudices the claim of any particular State; for no State has laid any claim, or can lay any claim, to the lands in question. This disposes of the supposed limitation to the third section of the fourth article.

The sixth article manifestly has no relation to the public domain. It is in these words:

"All debts contracted and engagements entered into before the adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this Constitution as under the Confederation."

It is satisfied by applying it to the then existing public debt, and to then existing treaties. We learn from the Federalist that it was so understood by the framers of the Constitution.

Mr. Madison recites it in the forty-third number of the Federalist, with this remark:

"This can only be considered as a declaratory proposition, and may have been inserted, among other reasons, for the satisfaction of the foreign creditors of the United States, who cannot be strangers to the pretended doctrine, that a change in the political form of society had the magical effect of dissolving its moral obligations."

There is, then, no limitation or qualification of the absolute power of Congress to dispose of the domain contained in the Constitution itself. Nor does the provision contained in the deed of cession from Virginia affect it.

Let us now concede that the constitutional power to dispose of the public domain is affected, and even controlled, by the deed of cession from Virginia. There is nothing in the bill which conflicts with that provision. The provision is only this: dust the lands ceded by Virginia shall be considered a common fund, for the use and benefit of all the States, and be faithfully and bona fide disposed of for that purpose. The bill under consideration does consider the ten millions of acres a common fund, for the use and benefit of all the States, and does faithfully and bona fide dispose of it for their common and equal use and benefit.

But the President argues that the public domain, or the proceeds resulting from sales of it, and not expended, cannot be apportioned among the States, but must remain a common fund, which, as it has been pledged heretofore, and is now pledged, so hereafter it may again be pledged for public debt. But this argument proves too much. It would invalidate all grants of bounty lands, in consideration of past services in the Army and Navy of the United States. And it would equally invalidate all grants for the construction of canals and railroads, neither of which modes of disposing of the public lands has the President condemned.

The President seeks to extricate himself from this dilemma by raising a theory which has no foundation in the Constitution, or in any contemporaneous exposition of it, and justifies the grants which have been made for the construction of railroads and canals upon the principle that the United States, being a landholder within the States, may lawfully give away one portion of its lands, without consideration, for the purpose of thereby enhancing the value of what remains. But it is apparent that the constitutionality of a grant is thus made to depend upon the fact that the value of the land given away is not more than the increase of the value of what remains; and so that Government must necessarily raise the price of the lands retained to the utmost of their increased value. Such a course is never pursued. The Government which should pursue it might act as a prudent landholder, but would, at the same time, act as an oppressive and tyrannical ruler. This theory, that the Government must act as a prudent landholder, seems to me altogether fanciful. It is not capable of universal application at all places and under all circumstances. A prudent landholder might give away one fourth of his land, in some places, to enhance the value of the rest; and at other times half, and at other times three fourths, but not everywhere and always the same proportion.